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THE PROCESS OF TERRY-LAWMAKING
DANIEL RICHMAN*
The organizers of this Conference obviously gave a lot of
thought to its structure. We started off with a session that
showed the Supreme Court at its best, working under the gentle
leadership of Chief Justice Warren, and guided by the sage counsel of Justice Brennan, to balance the demands of the Fourth
Amendment with the exigencies of street encounters. Now we
come to a session in which the Supreme Court comes off well, not
merely in one, but in both papers. For Steve Saltzburg, Terry1
itself may not have been perfect, but, over time, the Court has
made it "practically perfect."2 David Harris is not so satisfied,
however, he has no quarrel with the Court either.3 The bad actors in David's piece are the lower courts that have been tonedeaf to the Supreme Court's demands for particularized inquiries
into reasonable suspicion. These courts have instead developed
gross categorical rules that relieve police officers of the burden of
justification that the Court tried to put on them in Terry.4
Given what I know about some of the people who will be
participating in sessions of this Conference after this one, I have
a feeling it's going to be downhill for the Supreme Court from
here. I don't want to be too mean. I will not condemn the Court.
My politeness will go even further; I will not castigate the lower
courts. I will not even really disagree with either Steve or
David. I shall be the model guest.
David is quite right to argue that the gross categorical rules
developed by the lower courts have undercut the fact-sensitivity
at the heart of the Terry doctrine that Steve speaks so highly of.

Associate Professor, Fordham Law School
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 Steven A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 911 (1998).
*

1 Terry v.

3 See David A. Harris, ParticularizedSuspicion, CategoricalJudgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST.

JOHN'S L. REV. 975 (1998).
4 See id.

1043

1044

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[72:1043

These overbroad categorical rules are not coincidental, though.
They are an almost inevitable product of the procedural context
in which Terry doctrine operates. Indeed, the whole Terry story
makes a great case study in how the structure of our adjudicatory system affects the contours of constitutional rights.
How does Terry law really develop? Sure, Supreme Court
cases may have some impact,5 but they do not have as much impact as the daily grind of the criminal justice system. Let us go
through the process step by step.
A police officer makes an investigative stop. Perhaps he acts
out of arbitrariness, perhaps racism, or perhaps just an inchoate
sense that something is amiss. Whatever his actual motivations,
odds are that he will not be under any immediate internal obligation to justify the stop to his superiors. If nothing comes of the
stop-no prosecution, no seizure, none of those rare civil suitsour officer will not have to articulate the basis of his suspicion.'
The pressures on him to internalize Terry doctrine are thus
somewhat limited.
The stops our police officer will have to justify are primarily
those that result in prosecution. When this happens, he is not
going to be on his own. He probably will get considerable help
from a prosecutor. When the prosecutor sits down with the officer and develops his articulated justification, she is not suborning perjury. Because the Terry standard is an objective one,7
r See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (holding that police may
seize items discovered by touch during a lawful pat down search); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130-36 (1990) (concluding that discovery of contraband need
not be inadvertent for a valid seizure, so long as the item is instantly apparent and
discovered during a lawful search); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-28 (1987)
(declaring that probable cause, rather than reasonable suspicion, is necessary to invoke the plain view doctrine for search and seizure in the suspect's home); Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983) (holding a police officer may conduct a limited search of a suspect's car where there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
armed and dangerous); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979) (clarifying that
there must be reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous before a
search can be conducted).
6 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) ("Not only have we never
held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection.., that
an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth
Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary."); Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) ("[Tjhe fact that the officer does not have
the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action."); see also David A. Sklansky,
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there is nothing at all improper about her probing the officer's
recollection and drawing out elements that she feels will bolster
the state's claim that the stop was justified. The stop and frisk
was the officer's. The subsequent articulation of the grounds for
the measure is likely to be the prosecutor's.
What will inform this collaborative articulation process?
The prosecutor may not have a good feel for the realities of the
streets, but she does keep up with the case law. And the only
case law that really counts is appellate case law. After all, most
trial courts don't even produce written decisions on Terry issues.
When they do, those decisions have limited precedential value.
What do appellate cases look like? George Thomas has
given us an idea.8 In this fact-sensitive area, most will be affirmances, based primarily on deference to the factual findings of
the trial judge. To be sure, the ultimate question of whether
there was "reasonable suspicion" will be a mixed question that,
at least in the federal system, the appellate court will review de
novo. 9 As George has pointed out, however, many state courts
have a different, more deferential standard." And, in any event,
as the remand in Ornelas illustrated, the ostensible degree of
appellate scrutiny probably does not make much difference, as a
practical matter, in this fact-sensitive area." The inclination of
the appellate court will be to distance itself from the complex,
possibly subtle particulars of the stop, and rely on the good
judgment of the trial court. Moreover, even if the appellate court
were actually to give serious consideration to all those particulars, its opinion probably would not. Whether it upholds the stop
or finds it inadequately justified, its opinion will likely be quite
stylized, focusing on a few factors (present or absent) that it
deems salient. 2
Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997
SUP. CT. REV., 271, 284-91 (discussing the Court's objective approach).
" See George C. Thomas HI,Terry v. Ohio in the Trenches: A Glimpse at How
CourtsApply "ReasonableSuspicion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1025 (1998).
9 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (stating that this type
of appellate review is most consistent with the Court's own approach to determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists).
'0 See Thomas, supra note 8.
" See United States v. Ornelas, Nos. 94-3349, 94-3350, 1996 WL 508569, at *1
(7th Cir. Sept. 4, 1996) (unpublished table decision) (applying de novo standard of
review to uphold the probable cause determination that the court previously upheld
as not "clearly erroneous").
12 See Hon. Raymond C. Fisher, Justice Brennan's Supporting Role, 72 ST.
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When our stop gets litigated in the trial court, the prosecutor will therefore defend it in terms of the factors that the appellate courts have deemed salient. 3 Then the trial court will rule
on the stop. Maybe the court's decision will be based upon sensitive inquiry into the particular facts and circumstances of the
stop. Maybe it won't. What is certain is that if the ruling is appealed, the Terry issue will be presented, by both sides, with an
eye to the salient factors highlighted in previous appellate opinions. If one really wants to see what happened to Terry's requirement of a fact-sensitive analysis, one has only to look at the
briefs in so many Terry appeals, with all their boiler plate arguments and string citations.
Eventually, the appellate court will rule. Its ruling will rely
on the salient factors highlighted in the briefs, or the lack
thereof. If published, this new decision will be used by prosecutors when preparing the next case. And so the cycle continues.
With every turn, this process works to generalize, expand and
embed the categories that David Harris complains of.'4 Overbroad categories are not caused by any judicial antipathy to
Terry. They are a virtually inevitable product of a system in
which after-the-fact objective justifications are informed by appellate decisions that are at least one step removed from the
particular facts and circumstances of a case. I, therefore, think
David is far too optimistic in thinking that a message from the
Supreme Court would set things to right in the lower courts."
The part of my story in which the prosecutor helps the police
officer tidy up, strengthen, maybe even manufacture, the articulation of his reasonable suspicion points up a fundamental tension in Terry doctrine.
Steve Saltzburg correctly points out how Terry (or least the
Terry line of cases) stepped into an obvious vacuum creating a
middle-tier scrutiny for intermediately intrusive police actions.' 6
The cases take a common sense approach to police-citizen contacts that are inevitable and necessary, but that really do not fit
within doctrine governing full-blown arrests and searches.

JOHN'S L. REV. 905 (1998).
'3This certainly was my experience when I was an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York in 1987-92.
See Harris, supra note 3.
See id.
16 See Saltzburg, supra note 2.
'5
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Without Terry, courts would have to choose between ignoring the
constitutional implications of street stops, or applying a probable-cause standard to them, and possibly watering down that
standard in the process. Some may find Terry and its progeny
too deferential toward the judgment calls of police officers in
such encounters, but without Terry, such judgments might have
gone completely unregulated. Moreover, by looking only to
"reasonableness," these cases ensure that probable cause remains a meaningful standard, reserved for full-fledged searches
and seizures. At the heart of the Supreme Court's Terry decisions is thus an appreciation of a police officer's job and knowledge, and a desire to give him some degree of protection when
he's doing that job. 7 The idea, as Steve notes, is to have judges
approach cases from the perspective of law enforcement officers.18 Just as we recognize a special province for jurors, in
which they draw on their "common sense conclusions about human behavior," so should we give some deference to the competence of police officers. 9 Let cops do what they do best, with
courts ensuring only that they don't act arbitrarily, or worse.
The use of an objective approach in Terry cases, however,
flies in the face of this rationale. How can we say that we are
letting cops be cops when, in fact, the Terry inquiry takes place
in the context of retrospective litigation about hypothetical motivations? Surely, a subjective approach has its own problems.
Probing the mind of a law enforcement officer is not something
that courts are spectacularly good at. A subjective approach
would put even more pressure on police officers to "shade" their
testimony.0 My point is not to argue for a subjective approach,
or to argue against an objective one. It is only to say that the
justification for Terry seems inconsistent with an objective ap-

11 See

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1968).
Saltzburg, supra note 2.
'9 Id. ("Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical
18 See

people formulated certain common sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors
as factfinders are permitted to do the same and so are law enforcement officers.")
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
See Morgan Cloud, Judges, "Testilying," and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1341, 1382-86 (1996) (advocating a two-part test for traffic stops, examining
both the officer's subjective motivations, and the objective reasonableness of the
stop); Tracey Maclin, Race and the FourthAmendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 37986 (1998) (discussing the pervasiveness of police peijury in traffic stop cases).
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proach. We want to protect good police work, not creative litigation.
This inconsistency becomes even more marked if we start
importing broader social policy considerations into our assessment of Terry stop justifications. David Harris's condemnation
of cases that turn on incongruity highlights the inherent difficulty that courts must face in trying to develop a jurisprudence
of appropriately articulated police "hunches." There is something deeply troubling about letting police stop white kids because they are in predominately black neighborhoods, or black
kids because they are in predominately white neighborhoods.
The problem is not just a matter of technical Equal Protection
doctrine. I'd like to think that most of us start with an instinctive discomfort with all official rationales that turn on race. The
problem is not merely symbolic: Fourth Amendment doctrine
that accepts this rationale encourages cops to think in racial
terms, and exacerbates the racial polarization that often infects
community-police relations.
Moreover, to extent that these
"incongruity"-based stops become widespread, they deter the
easy commerce between neighborhoods that we must foster if we
want to end racial divisiveness.2 2
The costs of the "incongruity" cases are nicely spelled out in
David Harris's article, and will, I am sure, also be discussed at
length later in this Conference." My point here is not to defend
these cases. I merely want to suggest that an alternative doctrine that was far more skeptical about all race-based articulations of suspicion would raise some of its own questions about
the extent to which courts are to respect the expertise and experience of law enforcement officers. It seems outrageous to support any doctrinal approach that would permit a rookie cop in a
new neighborhood to use race as his main criteria for stopping

21

See Harris, supra note 3.

See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 153 (1997). Kennedy argues:
Permitting color to count, albeit only in conjunction with other considerations, as an indicia of suspiciousness... contributes to residential racial
separation, one of the most intractable and consequential problems in
America. Racially selective policing will help to dissuade blacks from venturing into neighborhoods where they are viewed as being "out of place,"
"not belonging."
Id. (footnote omitted).
"See Harris, supra note 3.
'2
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people. But what about the experienced cop fitting the description that Reuben Payne gave us of Officer McFadden24 who, although he would prefer it otherwise, has found to his sadness
that the only people of X race who visit his patrol sector are kids
looking to buy drugs, to rob, or whatever? To put the problem in
New York terms: What of the New York City police officer in
Washington Heights who regularly watches white kids from New
Jersey come over the George Washington Bridge to buy crack
near Audubon Avenue?'
Since race is so problematic, we (or at least many of us)
would like to demand that this cop articulate something more
than just race. A lot more. If our police departments are to gain
the full confidence of all groups in the communities they serve,
our doctrine must promise a dramatic break from our ugly history of racist enforcement patterns.26 Just as the Supreme Court
did in Batson v. Kentucky, 7 when it ruled out race as a lawful
basis for peremptory strikes,28 Terry doctrine therefore ought to
turn a deaf ear (at least for now) to any empirical justifications
offered for race-based decision-making. But to the extent we
minimize the role that race can play in any effort to justify our
cop's stop (andI think we should), our cop and his colleagues are
24

See Reuben M. Payne, The Prosecutor's Perspective on Terry: Detective

McFaddenHad a Right to ProtectHimself, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 733 (1998).
's Perhaps I date myself with this example. But this was a scenario that used to
arise with some frequency when the U.S. Attorney's Office took these cases in the
late 1980s. See David M. Halbfinger, A Neighborhood Gives Peace a Wary Look, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 1998, at Al (describing how, in Washington Heights in the mid1980s, "four or five drug crews might share a single block, their street peddlers
swarming over cars with out-of-state plates").
One interesting consequence of the increased federal interest in low-level drug
and other street crimes, perhaps, has been to expose the lower federal courts to a
far broader array of Terry litigation than otherwise would have been the case in a
world where relatively few claims are brought under § 1983. See Kathleen F. Brickley, CriminalMischief-The Federalizationof American CriminalLaw, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 1135, 1154 (1995) (discussing the increase of federal involvement in criminal
law); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (precluding the relitigation of claims from state criminal cases where there has been a fair and full opportunity for litigation provided by the state).
See KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 76-135.
27

476 U.S. 79 (1986).

28See id. at 84; see also Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discriminationin
Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 92 COLLUM. L. REV. 725, 732 (1992)
(arguing that the underlying holding of Batson is that "even if there were some statistical support for the view that jurors tend to be especially sympathetic to defendants of their own race, it would be profoundly wrong to enshrine any such view in
our constitutional jurisprudence").
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hardly going to believe us when we turn around and claim that
we are just trying to promote good police work and prevent arbitrary enforcement. Perhaps our veteran cop will start developing "hunches" that are more grounded in judicially approved factors. Perhaps he will just work harder with the prosecutor after
the stop, to justify it appropriately. Either way, the gulf between
policing and Terry litigation widens.
In the end, there is a degree of futility to the whole enterprise. I suppose one might argue that there is no such thing as a
good police hunch: that all alleged "hunches" either can be fully
articulated, in light of particular facts and circumstances, or, if
they can't be, can fairly be ascribed to arbitrariness or, worse,
prejudice, conscious or subconscious. 29 I am uncomfortable with
this analysis. Like professionals or craftsmen in other areas, a
trained officer with experience in a community can often sense
something wrong, even where it cannot easily be articulated.
Moreover, having been selected according to a list of criteria on
which the ability to offer legal justifications may not rank very
high, and lacking access to the kind of comprehensive data bases
that other professionals draw upon to educate and justify their
intuitions, our police officer will often be particularly illequipped to articulate the factors informing his hunches.
This leads to a more subtle argument, one that has more
force. It acknowledges that there is such a thing as a real
"hunch," and/or that retrospective judicial inquiries into an officer's conduct may not be able to capture the full extent of his
justification. Without denying that a scheme of judicial review
that is willfully deaf to certain enforcement justifications can
lead to false negatives, this argument contends that this cost is
outweighed by socially important benefits we obtain from at
least trying (maybe not very successfully) to control arbitrariness
and racism. I think we should embrace this argument. But if we
do, we can't turn around and say that we are just trying to ensure that cops can do their jobs, just trying to allow a "trained
officer" to make the "inferences and deductions that might well
elude an untrained person.""0
See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 441-42 n.1 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe basis of the decision to single out particular passengers during a
suspicionless sweep is less likely to be inarticulable than unspeakable.") (emphasis
omitted).
20Saltzburg, supra note 2.
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So I suppose we should both celebrate Terry's effort to apply
the Fourth Amendment pragmatically to the exigencies of street
encounters, and chide those courts that are insufficiently sensitive to the racial dimensions of their Terry analyses. But we
should recognize the tension between these two positions.

